The authors review a number of critical issues in the structural reform of animal 
Within a decade, African veterinary care moved from being more state-controlled than its human health care counterpart to being considerably more privatised. The theories that drove this profound change were largely simple neo-liberal ones, derived from neo-classical economics. International experts did make a valiant effort to protect state provision of veterinary regulation and the prevention of the most virulent epidemic diseases (7, 44, 46) . In general, however, curative animal health care was thrown into a laissez-faire market.
Policy-makers were implicitly (and perhaps unintentionally)
over-estimating the quality of information that buyers and sellers of veterinary services had about one another and under-estimating the importance of the large number of institutional structures that make animal health markets function well in the capitalist economies of the northern hemisphere. Not surprisingly then, African veterinary markets have not operated as well as expected and further attention to the institutions that frame the transactions of these markets is needed. Institutions are important. As this reality comes to be accepted, we are driven beyond neo-classical economics into the insights of organisation theory and sociology that have nurtured the exciting recent advances of New Institutional Economics (NIE).
What, then, can be learned from the NIE that might help to restructure animal health services in Africa? This question set the agenda for a five year, seven country, research project which was recently completed and in which the four authors have participated. The answers given in this article draw heavily on that research (25) .
Colonial provision and collective goods
According to Williamson, one of the founders of the NIE, it helps to first explain why colonial African States originally undertook to provide veterinary services (49) . Under the purest assumptions of neo-classical economics, the market works so well that individual private entrepreneurs should have undertaken to provide veterinary services themselves, and intervention by either the state or large corporations should have been unnecessary.
Veterinary Services were first introduced in Africa in order to deal with epidemic diseases, initially through stringent movement controls (quarantines) and then later through mass vaccination campaigns. For a long period of time these were the only veterinary services to indigenous African livestock for which economic benefits exceeded total costs, and this is still true in some parts of Africa (42) .
From a market point of view, the problem with movement controls and, to a lesser extent, vaccinations is that they are public goods. The economics literature has long made a distinction between public and private goods. Services are private goods when the individual who consumes them captures the full benefit of these services. Public goods exist when the benefits of a service 'spill over' to other members of the community. Economists hold that goods are 'public' whenever the 'exclusion' and the 'rival' principles are not operative: exclusion applies when access can be denied relatively easily to those who have not paid for a service; the rival principle operates when two consumers cannot both enjoy a specific benefit at the same time. A pure private good exists when both the exclusion and rival principles are true. A perfect example is a clinical farm visit by a veterinarian. The livestock owner captures the full benefit of the service while the veterinarian is present on the farm and no one else can benefit from the veterinarian during that time. Pure public goods are those to which neither principle applies. A classic example of such a public good is a radio broadcast on improved methods of keeping livestock. An additional listener subtracts nothing from the benefit of those already listening and preventing people from hearing the broadcast who have not paid is very difficult (37).
When exclusion is not possible, a 'collective' good exists (as opposed to a 'pure' public good). Without exclusion, economists consider that market failure is probable, because a 'free rider' problem exists. This simply means that those who have paid for the service cannot prevent those who have not paid from benefiting from the service as well (33) . In such a situation, persuading someone to take the initiative and pay for the service is often difficult, as everyone wants to wait and be a 'free rider'. The state then frequently and appropriately intervenes to provide the service, and may use powers of taxation to force all beneficiaries to pay for this service. the terms signify only that economically optimal provision of these goods is not straight forward under market conditions (6) .
Movement control is very much a public good; the animals that benefit are any and all that are outside the quarantine and thereby spared exposure to an epidemic, irrespective of whether or not the owners have paid for the service. The fact that movement control brings no benefit to the owner whose herd is quarantined and instead denies access to markets with better prices means that enforcement generally requires coercion. This combination of public good and coercion means that any collectivity other than the state would have difficulty executing movement control. The state holds a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force in society (47) and the transaction costs in gaining access to this coercive force would be lower if the executing agent were the state itself.
Vaccinations to prevent epidemics also possess a collective goods aspect (44) . Under the epidemiological principle of 'herd immunity', if a certain percentage of a population is immunised against a disease, an epidemic will be unable to spread in it and even the unimmunised members, providing they are few, will be relatively safe. Since immunisation presents potential negative side effects in addition to the costs of administering the vaccine, there is a 'free rider' problem; the individual herder does not need to immunise much of his stock as long as others are immunising their animals.
However, if a sufficient number of herders reason in this way a serious epidemic can occur fairly easily. Some method of assuring collective action is always needed -or so it would seem.
The categorical reasoning dictated by the classical public/private goods distinction proves too blunt an instrument for the fine art of making veterinary policy, although it is useful for grasping the issues involved. An alternative method of analysing public goods is to speak of 'externalities' (44) . An externalities approach contrasts the costs and benefits incurred by the immediate parties to a transaction with those who are affected by the transaction only indirectly and therefore are 'external' to it. The 'internal'
and 'external' benefits each can be either positive or negative.
Research by Koma with herders from Uganda (18) strongly suggests several advantages to this method of conceptualising these issues, as compared to the classical public/private goods formulation. Firstly, this method lends itself more readily to degrees of difference; the public versus private goods language is categorical and handles mixed types awkwardly. Secondly, the externality method leads to a better evaluation of the adequacy of private demand as both internal and external benefits for a service are quantified (rather than categorised).
Where the unit of consumption is 'bulky' so that the private purchaser decides not how much, but whether to buy, it is perfectly possible for private consumption decisions to also be socially optimal. Koma found that herders from Uganda considered immunisations against prevalent diseases to be so valuable at the market price that no public subsidies were needed. On the other hand, the private 'benefits' of quarantine are so negative that no amount of public subsidy, short of purchase of the animal at its healthy price, would induce herders to comply voluntarily. Koma found that collective purchase by a co-operative would not have changed the shape of demand for either immunisations or quarantines, contrary to the implication one would derive at first from the public/private goods method of analysis (18) .
In addition to the externalities aspect of disease prevention, in the colonial period, African herders discounted the future heavily (i.e. paid more attention to present benefit than to future risk) and lacked the knowledge that would enable an appreciation of the scientific basis of the measures that were being proposed. This violation of the rationality assumptions of economic action together with the fact that the veterinary profession discounted the future to a smaller degree, thus also argued for the state as the agent of service delivery at that time.
This historical argument has less force today: where the threat of killer diseases, such as rinderpest, is acute, livestock producers as different as those of Uganda and the Central African Republic have been eager to buy immunisations (18, 43) . On the other hand, Ly found that in locations such as Senegal where no outbreak has occurred for some time, veterinarians still give much higher priority to the immunisations than herders do (27) .
Finally, given the modest demand for veterinary services when they were first introduced and the tremendous distances that were involved, any private animal health 
Making privatisation effective
A strong consensus has emerged that certain animal health functions could be privatised relatively easily, especially clinical diagnosis and treatment and the production and distribution of drugs (15, 34, 35, 41, 44, 46) . Indeed, there even are times when the majority of producers would be right to seek the privatisation of a service that the state is willing to continue to provide on a subsidised basis. Government provision of goods and services at subsidised rates is effective policy in only two cases, as follows: In fact, in most of Africa neither of these cases occurs at present and the existence of subsidised programmes actually reduces the potential for both wealthy and poor livestock owners to be served to the extent they desire and can afford.
There are three reasons for this, as follows:
a) for political and social reasons, subsidised services tend to go to wealthy rather than poor farmers b) government regulations prohibit private entry or make private provision sufficiently unprofitable that it is not offered c) by reducing the volume of remaining demand, a subsidised government service may cause private service to be much more expensive, due to losses of economies of scale (15, 19, 22, 26 
Efficiencies
Establishing that particular inputs and services should be candidates for full privatisation and others for public sector contracting under certain conditions is only the first step in specifying the appropriate shape of services. Issues of structure, quality and price remain. To simplify the matter, these issues will be discussed with particular reference to preventive and curative inputs and services for both small and non-commercial livestock producers.
The extent to which privatised preventive and curative services are actually used by producers will depend on the price and availability of these services (both in time and in space). Woods found a definite decrease in the demand for curative services in Zimbabwe as the distance, and hence the cost in terms of time and effort to reach the veterinary supply, increased. In addition, Woods showed that the supply of curative services to the more distant farmers increased greatly when the veterinary service providers had access to motorbikes (51) . Thus, the development of economies in service provision is absolutely central, an issue to which donors have given little attention in the privatisation debate.
Making services available on market days, at gazetted dipping times, and along pre-set routes which animal health providers etc., which in this text, will be referred to simply as drugs).
However, in research undertaken by the authors and others, such patterns of service have not been observed. If full veterinarians employ assistants they tend to be untrained ones and they do not use route systems as described above (18, 28, 34) .
In most of rural Africa, where exotic dairy animals are rare, This system provides an incentive to veterinarians to work longer hours and to remain in the rural areas, while still keeping the prices charged within the reach of lesscommercialised producers. Sandford reports that this system is so successful in India that veterinarians actually refuse promotions to headquarters in order to retain supplemental private rural practices (38) . An alternative mechanism for achieving much the same effect is for the state to contract private veterinarians to provide certain public functions within an area, again leaving the veterinarian free to provide private care in addition. This system is used effectively in Sweden and Morocco (13, 41) .
Both of the preceding systems effectively provide a state subsidy for the existence of a private curative practice in a community. On paper this would appear to be no different than the provision of these services by a government itself, for a set fee. The operational superiority of the former alternatives over the latter, government alternative derives from the quite different sets of incentives at work. Under the quasi-private systems, the veterinarian has a direct, personal incentive to increase the volume of his (or her) work and consequently works both longer hours and requires less supervision. Since the pharmaceutical supplies being handled are also then private, the state is spared the substantial problems of management of these supplies, including the prevention of corruption (see below). Thus, because the transaction costs are lower, the quasi-private systems are likely to be much more efficient than the public alternatives, and to be able to offer a much larger volume of service for the same combined level of private fees and public subsidies.
The major fear that directors of veterinary services express about these mixed government/market systems of care is that the personal commercial incentives to provide private goods are going to be so great that the various collective goods the state is paying for will receive scant attention. Such a trade-off is not inevitable. If the increase in commercial incentives simply leads the veterinarian to work longer hours to meet the demand for private goods and there is no change in the time devoted to collective goods, the same amount of collective goods will still be provided. Indeed, because the transaction costs from travel are so large in veterinary medicine in Africa, there is likely to be considerable synergy between the two types of service, with veterinarians using the travel required for private functions to provide public services, such as management advice, to producers who otherwise would not be reached, and similarly to provide curative services to clients encountered on immunisation campaigns. George
Njiru reports that as much as half of the requests for curative care received by veterinarians in central Kenya come after the veterinarian is already in the locality on other business
The authors would expect that the degree to which provision of public goods was protected in these mixed systems would be a function of both of the following:
a) the extent of professionalisation b) the volume of private demand.
The deeper the commitment of the veterinarian to the core values of veterinary medicine and state service, the more they will resist incursions on the time spent on public goods functions and the greater the degree to which their response to private incentives will be only an increase in the total amount of time worked. The extent of the steps taken by the veterinary professional association to encourage and regulate adherence to these values thus becomes an important variable, as will be argued later.
On the demand side, as the clamour for private services increases, veterinarians will reach a point at which they no longer have any leisure that they are willing to surrender, for the marginal value of their time will have grown, and they will begin to increase the prices they charge for their care. This Veterinary paraprofessionals who are provided with motorbikes increase attention to curative care and reduce the amount of time devoted to preventive duties at the dips (51).
The authors do not know if the amount of preventive care provided is thereby deficient. However, the fact that the government stipulates the same fixed fee for the slow response of a paraprofessional on bus or bike and the more rapid response of a motorised one, clearly stimulates increased demand for the latter. If the price charged could be increased in response to the increased demand for the more valuable service, the pressure to move away from prevention would be reduced or the increased revenues for a full private system would be created. It is interesting that the same trade-offs exist in both public and private service delivery systems.
Pharmaceutical supply
The economic survival of veterinarians would also be enhanced if they were vendors of drugs (themselves and through auxiliaries) and used the greater capital and transport available to them to supply drugs that need to be controlled or and that the paperwork requirements for receipts and stock control discourage paraprofessionals from making sales, since they derive no compensating financial benefit.
If veterinary pharmaceuticals are to be handled on the private market, however, does there need to be any control over distribution? The following two issues are at stake here:
-permission for a product to be distributed in a country at all -control over when the product may be sold and to whom it may be sold.
The first is highly technical and quite susceptible to improper influence by the drug companies. Most African States lack the necessary combination of institutionalised competence and assured integrity to perform it well. To undertake the task of drug evaluation properly is extremely expensive. Thus, there is every reason for countries that are similar in their economies and ecologies to pool the costs of this task.
Delegation of the function to an international body that has the resources to sustain the integrity of the technical skills Without a connection to these two aspects of the profession, paraprofessionals will rapidly become isolated from the collective good and changing aspects of their field. No matter how appropriate the training and intentions are at the point that the paraprofessional sets up in private practice, it seems inevitable that in time they would become a quack.
The foregoing considerations suggest that four steps should be taken if the market is to be allowed to freely determine the demand for various types of animal health personnel, as follows:
a) It is necessary to decide which levels of animal health personnel have sufficient training to be able, in principle, to operate outside the supervision of full veterinarians, to provide for the externalities that attend the services they sell, and to be capable of the periodic updating that will be necessary for the fulfilment of these particular functions c) The tasks that these cadres are permitted to perform and the drugs they are able to sell have to be clearly specified and 
Monopoly
The structure of an animal health care delivery system -the level of training of the provider and the extent to which economical structures are achieved -is a critical determinant of the price that these services will cost the producer, but it is not the only one. Another determinant is competition, which offers the most effective mechanism for assuring the lowest economic price for a good or service. Unfortunately, however, competition is often imperfect in the animal health sector. The low density of producers and hence of effective demand Williamson (50) has shown that this reasoning is defective in several respects -some mechanism has to be found to arbitrate the differences over the contract that will inevitably arise because of unforeseen circumstances and to enforce the terms of both the original contract and any amendments.
Except in special circumstances, such arrangements are tantamount to regulation, which is exactly what competitive bidding is supposed to avert. Nonetheless, these special circumstances can be created for veterinary practices.
Williamson suggests that competitive bidding will avert the local monopoly problem if the following conditions apply: a) the contract is subject to rebidding at relatively short intervals b) neither party has significant sunk assets invested in the agreement at the time of rebidding.
To these points a third might be added, which Williamson takes for granted, as follows: c) the party making the contract with the bidder to provide the services is genuinely acting on behalf of the clients who are going to be served.
With regard to the first point, Williamson (50) behalf. Under this alternative, the consumer also would retain the option to 'exit' an unsatisfactory service, although probably at less frequent intervals than the first alternative.
Added to the power of 'exit' would be that of the 'voice' of the co-operative leadership, who would be able to negotiate the particular parts of the service package that was to be offered and monitor delivery of the services (this alternative would be unacceptable if the co-operative had an effective monopoly for some service that the producer needed and the contract were negotiated by the co-operative leadership, for then the 'exit' option would be removed and the herder could easily be exploited by the leaders). A number of successful examples of such co-operatives exist, although where membership of the co-operative is voluntary, the entire population is rarely covered, and if membership is compulsory, the co-operative can be seriously inefficient (15, 34, 35, 41) .
As both of the first two options preserve the ability of individual producers to use an alternative veterinarian if dissatisfied with the services offered, these options lose the advantages of geographical contiguity. In order for the right of choice to be meaningful there have to be at least two veterinary practices or animal health co-operatives operating in the area. The overlap in service areas means that travel to clients will not be as efficient, and in sparsely populated areas these economic costs could be considerable. Furthermore, in the case of a disease outbreak or contaminated meat incident in an area, ascertaining which particular practice is responsible will be more difficult.
The third alternative captures all the advantages of geographical compactness, but in order to do so has to substitute 'voice' for 'exit'. Under this mechanism, all producers would periodically vote to determine who among the approved bidders would receive the contract.
Each of these potential arrangements have pros and cons which might make them more attractive for some production conditions than others. The third alternative is more likely to be appropriate to pastoral areas and the first feasible only for areas where demand for veterinary services has a dense distribution. The second generally would depend on the strength of the traditions of co-operative action in an area.
However, all three are mechanisms whereby the economic disadvantages of local monopoly can probably be countered and the interests of both livestock producers and society in general can be protected.
Principal-agent theory and the veterinary profession The agency literature suggests there would be some redistributive effects in moving from one, already established, set of monitoring relationships to another (36) . However, all parties are suffering from the agency losses that are being created by the weak and distorted incentives governing animal health practice in Africa today, and the market would distribute benefits to all concerned from the increase in economic efficiency that would result from reform.
In addition, long-term associations increase the value to agents of their relationships with principals. This makes limited monitoring by the principal more effective, for it increases the value of the threat to sever future connections if something is found to be wrong. Thus, the development of extended, personal relationships with animal health personnel, will be helpful to herders as it will enable a more discriminating judgement of the quality of service over a long period and allow the herder to bestow custom accordingly.
Furthermore, a 'large stock of value that could be lost through bad behaviour, such as reputation or assets subject to suit, is a strong incentive for good behaviour' (36) . If the penalty is a large fine and is paid by the faulty veterinarian to the aggrieved herder, as in a malpractice suit, the herder has considerable incentive to collect the money and the transaction is economically conservative (in the sense that little value is lost in the transfer). However if, as is more common, the penalty is a revocation of the right to practice, the transaction is 'non-conservative', since the veterinarian loses value but the herder gains nothing, and the penalty therefore is an economic dead loss. The fact that, because of its size, the penalty rarely has to be invoked makes it economically more efficient, since it is 'non-conservative' when used (36) . subgroup) increases with the inequality of the benefit that will be derived from the collective good (i.e. the asymmetry in demand). The more unequally distributed the potential benefits, the smaller the subgroup that will be needed to reach the critical point at which benefits outweigh costs, and the smaller the subgroup, the more likely it will achieve the cohesion necessary for collective action.
As the professions in most African countries not only are relatively small but also have members with unequal skills, Leonard thought the probability was high that at least some members would find it in their interests to organise so as to promote standards and product differentiation and capture a better price on the market when professional services are 
Résumé
Les auteurs étudient les grands enjeux liés à la réforme structurelle des prestations de services en santé animale pour les petits producteurs ainsi que les producteurs non commerciaux, et mettent en évidence plusieurs problèmes généralement négligés quand il s'agit de la privatisation de telles prestations. Les éléments suivants sont plus particulièrement pris en compte : a) la nécessité de réserver un rôle central aux paraprofessionnels dans le nouveau système mis en place ; b) les relations importantes et problématiques entre les professions vétérinaires et paravétérinaires ; c) l'importance du développement de procédures contractuelles par l'État afin de promouvoir des prestations privées pour les services zoosanitaires tout en évitant les problèmes de monopole local ; d) le rôle majeur que la déontologie devra jouer dans ce domaine pour préserver les biens collectifs et servir l'intérêt général. 
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Resumen
Tras repasar una serie de aspectos fundamentales de la reforma estructural de los servicios zoosanitarios en África para los pequeños productores y los productores no comerciales, los autores inciden en ciertos problemas que otras instancias implicadas en la privatización de esos servicios han tendido a obviar, haciendo hincapié sobre todo en los siguientes aspectos: a) la necesidad de reservar un papel central a los profesionales paraveterinarios dentro de los nuevos servicios de atención zoosanitaria; b) las importantes y problemáticas relaciones entre la profesión veterinaria y las profesiones paraveterinarias; c) la importancia de instituir mecanismos de contratación pública de apoyo a los servicios de atención veterinaria privados que sirvan para evitar los problemas derivados de la existencia de monopolios locales; y d) la gran importancia del profesionalismo en este ámbito para salvaguardarlos bienes públicos y los intereses colectivos.
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